Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Assistant Professor, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Shahid Chamran University of Ahvaz, Ahvaz, Iran

2 Associate Professor, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Shahid Chamran University of Ahvaz, Ahvaz, Iran

3 Ph.D. Candidate, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Shahid Chamran University of Ahvaz, Ahvaz, Iran

Abstract

 Russia’s position in the world gas market and common membership of Russia with Iran have given importance to the analysis of Russia's gas production behavior in the world gas market. Russia’s position in the global gas market and its excessive capacity in gas production provide this country with the possibility that in the long term, its behavior in natural gas production is aligned and symmetrical with the gas production of other members of the gas exporting countries, shale gas production, world natural gas demand, world natural gas price and the crude oil world price doesn’t change in order to stabilize the symmetric and aligned market. In this paper, Russia's gas production behavior was investigated by using seasonal data from 2001 to 2021 and by nonlinear autoregressive distributed lags (NARDL) method. The results showed that during changes (increase & decrease) in the mentioned variables; as the most important variables affecting the formation of changes in the supply and demand of the world Gas, Russia's gas production behavior in the direction of aligned market stability will not change. And in the GECF, Russia shows a similar behavior to Saudi Arabia in the OPEC.
Introduction
As a member of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), Russia has excess capacity in gas production, which is similar to the oil excess production of Saudi Arabia as a member of OPEC. In addition, both countries play a significant role in their respective organizations. Using data from 2001Q1 to 2021Q4, this research applies a nonlinear autoregressive distributed lags method and modifies Griffine’s (1985) model developed by Gatly et al. (2014) to analyze Russia’s gas production behavior in response to any promotion or reduction in gas production by other members of GECF, the shale gas production, the global demand of natural gas, and the global price of natural gas and oil, which can influence the global supply and demand of natural gas. Identifying and analyzing Russia’s asymmetrical behavior in the GECF and gas global market has essential outcomes for Iran as another member of the GECF. First, it leads to more robust predictions of Russia’s decisions when global supply and demand determinants of natural gas increase or decrease. Second, Iran can take action based on the results to increase its bargaining power in GECF in line with its national interests.
Methods and Material
As mentioned above, this research analyzes the behavior of countries in the GECF, which was founded in 2001. This means the study has a limited sample size. Therefore, Johansson's approach may not be reliable because it requires large samples to produce trustworthy results. In contrast, the autoregressive distributed lags method is a statistically more robust and suitable choice for identifying cointegration relationships in small samples (Ghatak & Siddiki, 2001). Furthermore, to analyze Russia's asymmetric behavior in the GECF and global gas market, this research employs the expanded method of autoregressive distributed lags, known as nonlinear autoregressive distributed lags, as presented by Shin et al. (2011).
Results and Discussion
The results show Russia has an asymmetric behavior in response to the gas production of other GECF members (  hypothesis is rejected). In other words, Russia's response to increases and decreases in production by other members is not the same. Furthermore, the negative coefficients of  and  state that when there is an increase in gas production by other members, Russia decreases gas production in the opposite direction, while when there is a decrease in production by other GECF members, Russia reduces its production in the same direction but to a lesser extent. During the study period, the results showed that Russia's gas production behavior is symmetric (failure to reject the  hypothesis) in the face of shale gas production. In fact, Russia's response to increases and decreases in shale gas production is the same. The positive coefficients suggest that Russia increases gas production when shale gas production increases. In other words, Russia's production is in line with shale gas production. However, in the long term, there is no significant relationship between decreases in shale gas production and Russia's gas production. Similarly, the results indicate that Russia's gas production behavior is asymmetric in response to global gas demand (rejecting the  hypothesis). In fact, Russia's response to increases and decreases in global gas demand is not the same. The positive coefficients of  suggest that Russia's gas production increases when global gas demand increases. However, in the long term, there is no significant relationship between decreases in global gas demand and Russia's gas production. Similarly, the results show that Russia's gas production behavior is asymmetric in response to global natural gas prices (rejecting the  hypothesis). In fact, Russia's response to increases and decreases in global natural gas prices is not the same. On the one hand, the negative coefficient suggests that Russia's gas production behavior decreases when global natural gas prices decrease. On the other hand, in the long term, there is no significant relationship between increases in global natural gas prices and Russia's gas production. This behavior suggests that Russia, given its excess gas production capacity, reduces its production in order to stabilize and adjust global natural gas prices when global natural gas prices fall. The results for the study period show that there is no significant long-term relationship between Russia's gas production and changes in global crude oil prices.
Conclusion
To sum up, this research shows that with changes (increases/decreases) in gas production of other GECF members the production of shale gas, and the global prices of natural gas and crude oil, which are essential determinants of global supply and demand, Russia's gas production behavior is not always aligned and symmetrical with the mentioned variables. According to Guttly et al. (2014), it can be concluded that Russia, like Saudi Arabia in OPEC, has an uncoordinated production behavior with other members of the forum and other mentioned variables.

Keywords

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