javad taherpoor; fatemeh rajabi
Volume 15, Issue 59 , January 2016, , Pages 35-56
Abstract
During last two decades, studies in the area of political economy focused more on how the political structure of a country can influence economic outcomes. It is reasoned that the higher the degree of political competition, the more the likelihood of implementing mature policies and parliament can do ...
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During last two decades, studies in the area of political economy focused more on how the political structure of a country can influence economic outcomes. It is reasoned that the higher the degree of political competition, the more the likelihood of implementing mature policies and parliament can do better its role to control and monitor the government and this has a positive impact on economic growth. On the other hand, when the degree of political competition decreases, the parliament either aligns with the government or confronts it, which in both cases the probability of implementing efficient and pro-growth policies will decrease.
In this study, we examine the effect of political competition on economic growth. Accordingly, the alignment between the parliamentary and presidential political party was considered as a measure of the presence of the political parties and political competition and it is entered in an economic growth model alongside other variables. Estimation of the model during years 1988-2014 showed that alignment of legislative and executive branches has a negative relationship with economic growth or more clearly, the decline in political competition has had a negative effect on economic growth.
Golrooz Ramezanzadeh Velis; Farshad Momeni
Volume 13, Issue 51 , January 2014, , Pages 19-51
Abstract
The phenomenon of “resource curse” or “paradox of plenty” is inconsistent with the general belief that natural resources always result in economic growth. The present study is focused on this question “why despite the fact that oil exporting developing countries benefit ...
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The phenomenon of “resource curse” or “paradox of plenty” is inconsistent with the general belief that natural resources always result in economic growth. The present study is focused on this question “why despite the fact that oil exporting developing countries benefit from the most major transfer of wealth without war, such countries suffer from economical failure”. To address the mentioned question, we have relied on a descriptive – analytic approach and employed the framework of institutionalism theory to study “shortsightedness” among decision makers and policymakers of such societies and finding consequences and damages of this trend and effective solutions for these problems. In order to study that how this phenomenon has been created and continues to persist, we have used “historical explanation” and “political economy”. In summary, according to causes specified by mentioned explanatory methods, the main factor was found in weakness of institutional structure. Considering Iran as the case study, this country experienced two shocks of income from petroleum industries in 1971 and 2011. By following the historical origins and considering the political economy of Iran, one can see that the finding of the present article is also true for Iran. In this regard and alongside with other amending solutions, adjustment of budgeting and taxation systems are proposed by the present study as solutions for achieving effective and productive utilization of incomes produced by petroleum industries for the purpose of long term development.