منابع
الف- فارسی
مطالعات ،« بررسی امکان حذف ایران از خط لوله نابوکو » ،( بهروزی فر، مرتضی ( 1390
. اقتصاد انرژ ، ی سال هشتم ، شماره 28
تحلیل سیاست صادرات گاز به کشورهای « ، ( جعفرزاده، امیر و عبدالساده نیسی ( 1391
فصلنامه اقتصاد محیط زیست و ،« هند و پاکستان در چهارچوب نظریه بازی ها
. انرژ ، ی شماره 2
منافع ملی و سیاست های بهره برداری از منابع نفت و گاز » ،( درخشان، مسعود ( 1382
. مجله مجلس و پژوه ، ش سال نهم، شماره 34
عبدلی، قهرمان ( 1392 )، نظریه باز یها و کاربردهای آن ( باز یهای اطلاعات ناقص،
تکاملی و همکارانه)، سازمان مطالعه و تدوین کتب علوم انسانی دانشگاه ها (سمت)،
مرکز تحقیق و توسعه علوم انسانی.
مصلح، کامران و دیگران ( 1387 )، استفاده بهینه از منابع گازی در ایرا ، ن تهران، مجلس
شورای اسلامی، مرکز پژوهش ها.
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