Hojjatollah Baramaki Yazdi; Davood Manzoor; Mohamad saeed Shadkar
Abstract
The history of oil contracts in the last century indicates that oil contracts are a form of conflict between the interests of foreign oil companies and national interests of reservoir-owning governments. In this context, an important question arises for reservoir-owning governments as to which existing ...
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The history of oil contracts in the last century indicates that oil contracts are a form of conflict between the interests of foreign oil companies and national interests of reservoir-owning governments. In this context, an important question arises for reservoir-owning governments as to which existing conventional upstream contracts should be chosen to maximize benefits. Representation theory has been used to answer this research question. In the designed model, each party's interest function in each of the upstream contracts is identified and modeled. Also, the rationality and motivation conditions in this model have been analyzed as participation constraints. The results of the proposed model using the genetic algorithm method show that, given field coordinates, the production-sharing contract has the lowest representation cost compared to the other two contracts of concession and service purchase. And as the selected model, production-sharing contracts can make the most profit for reservoir-owning governments.
Mohammad Hadi Zahidi Vafa; seyyed hasan ghavami
Volume 11, Issue 43 , January 2012, , Pages 239-255
Abstract
Game theory has a significant role in contemporary orthodox
economics. This theory studies the strategic behavior of players. So
strategic interaction is the key point in the games theory. Principalagent
model is an application of the theory. This model is applied
when a job or an activity ...
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Game theory has a significant role in contemporary orthodox
economics. This theory studies the strategic behavior of players. So
strategic interaction is the key point in the games theory. Principalagent
model is an application of the theory. This model is applied
when a job or an activity is delivered to an agent by a firm or another
agent called the principal. Naturally the terms and conditions
including the rights and obligations of two sides are elaborated in the
contract. Depending on whether the information on exact details of the
subject and the terms are the same or not, different models are
developed. One of the most important financing instruments in noninterest
banking as a main field of Islamic Economics is profit-loss sharing contracts among
which we can name sleeping partnership. The subject matter of sleeping partnership
is trade in which a capital owner finances the money needed by the agent to start a business
which is based on profit-loss sharing. This paper tries to construct an analytical model
to explain the sleeping partnership by appling principal– agent model with asymmetric
information case which is causing adverse selection .In this paper we showed that Islamic
finance instruments (sleeping partnership) in the spirit of profit-loss sharing can be explained
through the modern achievements of contemporary economics and we can analyze sleeping partnership with the help of game theory method.
