seyyed hasan ghavami; . .; teymour mohammadi; Mansour Ranjbar
Abstract
By considering the different importance of collateral variable in Islamic and in conventional banking, theoretical and experimental studies show that the necessary convergence in the credit relationship between bank and customer has not been achieved. In this article, in addition to the explaining feasibility ...
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By considering the different importance of collateral variable in Islamic and in conventional banking, theoretical and experimental studies show that the necessary convergence in the credit relationship between bank and customer has not been achieved. In this article, in addition to the explaining feasibility of studying and accepting empirical role of collateral in commercial profit - loss sharing contracts, we have studied the dual role of collateral as screening and motivation tool in banking relations. We have also used credit data of Bank Refah Kargaran with application of Logit estimation to test our hypotheses regarding the role of collateral. Based on our results, the hypothesis that borrowers with lower risk have provided safer collateral, has been confirmed. This result shows the existence of adverse selection phenomenon. So, low-risk individuals tend to send signals of their quality and reveal their situation to banks. In addition, other economic and social variables of contract could use the potential of signaling and contribute to reduce the role of collateral. In the data under consideration, except for the variable of account history-interest rate, this hypothesis was rejected and other economic and social variables have failed to have the expected impact.
Zahra Ziya’i; parisa mohajeri; Ali Nasiri Aghdam
Abstract
In real world, taxpayers have private information of which tax agencies are either completely or partly not aware of. This issue gives rise to the so-called asymmetric information problem, seriously preventing tax laws from being justly and efficiently enforced. Asymmetry of information motivates taxpayer ...
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In real world, taxpayers have private information of which tax agencies are either completely or partly not aware of. This issue gives rise to the so-called asymmetric information problem, seriously preventing tax laws from being justly and efficiently enforced. Asymmetry of information motivates taxpayer towards falsifying or concealing information, trying to enjoy benefits of failure to pay taxes (moral hazard); furthermore, by granting licenses to bad economic operators for operating as authorized economic operators, law-abiding companies may leave licensed and authorized market (adverse selection). It is obvious that, information sharing and availability of databases containing taxpayers’ information can help governments in recognizing and collecting taxes in a justly and fair manner. In this paper, using statistics from 92 countries during 2006 – 2012 (in the form of panel data), we have studied the effects of information sharing variables on tax-to-GDP ratio. The findings indicate that, information sharing has a positive, yet statistically insignificant, effect on the ratio, which is in agreement with theoretical foundations.
Mohammad Hadi Zahidi Vafa; seyyed hasan ghavami
Volume 11, Issue 43 , January 2012, , Pages 239-255
Abstract
Game theory has a significant role in contemporary orthodox
economics. This theory studies the strategic behavior of players. So
strategic interaction is the key point in the games theory. Principalagent
model is an application of the theory. This model is applied
when a job or an activity ...
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Game theory has a significant role in contemporary orthodox
economics. This theory studies the strategic behavior of players. So
strategic interaction is the key point in the games theory. Principalagent
model is an application of the theory. This model is applied
when a job or an activity is delivered to an agent by a firm or another
agent called the principal. Naturally the terms and conditions
including the rights and obligations of two sides are elaborated in the
contract. Depending on whether the information on exact details of the
subject and the terms are the same or not, different models are
developed. One of the most important financing instruments in noninterest
banking as a main field of Islamic Economics is profit-loss sharing contracts among
which we can name sleeping partnership. The subject matter of sleeping partnership
is trade in which a capital owner finances the money needed by the agent to start a business
which is based on profit-loss sharing. This paper tries to construct an analytical model
to explain the sleeping partnership by appling principal– agent model with asymmetric
information case which is causing adverse selection .In this paper we showed that Islamic
finance instruments (sleeping partnership) in the spirit of profit-loss sharing can be explained
through the modern achievements of contemporary economics and we can analyze sleeping partnership with the help of game theory method.
