A Comparative Study of Iran’s Electricity Market Auction Mechanism and System Marginal Price Auction Mechanism
Volume 14, Issue 53, Summer 2014, Pages 1-35
Jamshid Pajuyan, Teymour Mohammadi, Javid Bahrami, Faramarz Atbaei
Abstract The present article discusses the impacts of selecting between different common auctions in electricity markets (system marginal price auction and pay as bid auction) on production efficiency, total efficiency and average expected price in an asymmetric information situation, where each player’s information about the marginal cost of the competitor is incomplete. A simple model is designed to conduct the comparative study of alternative auction mechanisms. The model is based on two profit maximizing players, with full information about their own marginal cost and incomplete information about their competitor. Assumptions which have been used to construct the model are based on Iran’s electricity market structure. The outcome indicates that although players bid functions in alternative auction mechanism differ from each other, the production efficiency, total efficiency and the average expected price are equivalent.
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Volume 6, Issue 20, Spring 2006, Pages 43-70
Jamshid Pazhoyan, Majid Madah
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Volume 4, Issue 15, Winter 2005, Pages 53-74
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Volume 4, Issue 14, Autumn 2004, Pages 13-54
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Volume 2, Issue 4, Spring 2002, Pages 13-36
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Volume 1, Issue 2, Autumn 2001, Pages 57-74
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Volume 1, Issue 1, Summer 2001, Pages 25-34
jamshid pajhoyan
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