Author = Zahedi Vafa, Mohammad Hadi

The Impact of Fiscal Decentralization on Economic Growth and Income Distribution in Provinces of Iran

Volume 12, Issue 47, Winter 2013, Pages 97-122

Mehdi Sadeghi Shahdani, Akbare Komijani, Mohammad Hadi Zahedi Vafa, Mohammad Ghaffary Fard

Abstract In economic studies, fiscal decentralization theories are used to increase productivity and efficiency of government and to improve the balance between different regions and it is mentioned as one of the fundamental tools in the way of transition to a market economy in developing countries. After Islamic Revolution in Iran and especially after Iran-Iraq war, fiscal and economic decentralization was officially considered as a strategic policy for the development of Iran’s provinces. Firstly, the Provincial Planning Councils were founded and then the provincial revenue-expenditure system was devised to increase the degree of decentralization. But the main concern of economic planners was to investigate the mechanism of which the fiscal decentralization had an impact on economic growth and income distribution. In this paper, by using augmented Solow model, the direct and indirect effects of fiscal decentralization on economic growth is evaluated. After testing for the stationary of our panel of data, it is confirmed that there is a long-run relationship between variables of the model by using Pedroni and Kao tests. After estimating the model by using generalized least squares (GLS) method, it was shown that during the period of 1379-1386, fiscal decentralization (based on two measures of decentralization of national investment expenditures and decentralization of provincial investment expenditures) had a positive effect on economic growth and income distribution in provinces. This effect was in a way that one percent increase in fiscal decentralization would increase economic growth rate up to 0/04 percent. In addition, fiscal decentralization improve income distribution in provinces and indirectly affects economic growth of different regions.

Principle – Agent Model for Sleeping Partnership Moral hazard

Volume 11, Issue 43, Winter 2012, Pages 239-255

Mohammad Hadi Zahidi Vafa, seyyed hasan ghavami

Abstract Game theory has a significant role in contemporary orthodox economics. This theory studies the strategic behavior of players. So strategic interaction is the key point in the games theory.  Principalagent model is an application of the theory. This model is applied when a job or an activity is delivered to an agent by a firm or another agent called the principal. Naturally the terms and conditions including the rights and obligations of two sides are elaborated in the contract. Depending on whether the information on exact details of the subject and the terms are the same or not, different models are developed. One of the most important financing instruments in noninterest banking as a main field of Islamic Economics is profit-loss sharing contracts among which we can name sleeping partnership. The subject matter of sleeping partnership  is trade in which a capital owner finances the money needed by the agent to start a business which is based on profit-loss sharing. This paper tries to construct an analytical model to explain the sleeping partnership by appling principal– agent model with asymmetric information case which is causing adverse selection .In this paper we showed that Islamic finance instruments (sleeping partnership) in the spirit of profit-loss sharing can be explained through the modern achievements of contemporary economics and we can analyze sleeping partnership with the help of game theory method.