Mohsen Yazdinejad; Tohid Firouzan Sarnaghi; Ali Nassiri Aghdam
Abstract
One of the issues in complex organizations is management of personnel movements. On the one hand, personnel tend to change their positions from one sector of organization to another part or from one post to another post or move to another branch of the organization in a new city. On the other hand, administrators ...
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One of the issues in complex organizations is management of personnel movements. On the one hand, personnel tend to change their positions from one sector of organization to another part or from one post to another post or move to another branch of the organization in a new city. On the other hand, administrators reposition personnel inside an organization to avoid burnout and facilitate dynamic improvement of the organization. But internal movement inside an organization is faced with challenges, such that it should not cause any posts to be vacant and this requires access to a great deal of information about human resources of the organization and the need to processing them. In this study, we propose an algorithm using market design theory that permits managers to efficiently manage internal movement of human resources. This algorithm was developed by TTCC method and programmed in C# language. To demonstrate the accuracy of proposed algorithm, we applied it to a hypothetical organization with 2325 personnel, 155 branches and 400 internal movement requests. Simulation shows that proposed algorithm increases internal movement of human resources by 11% and help human resource management of organization to be more effective.
Jamshid Pajuyan; Teymour Mohammadi; Javid Bahrami; Faramarz Atbaei
Volume 14, Issue 53 , July 2014, , Pages 1-35
Abstract
The present article discusses the impacts of selecting between different common auctions in electricity markets (system marginal price auction and pay as bid auction) on production efficiency, total efficiency and average expected price in an asymmetric information situation, where each player’s ...
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The present article discusses the impacts of selecting between different common auctions in electricity markets (system marginal price auction and pay as bid auction) on production efficiency, total efficiency and average expected price in an asymmetric information situation, where each player’s information about the marginal cost of the competitor is incomplete. A simple model is designed to conduct the comparative study of alternative auction mechanisms. The model is based on two profit maximizing players, with full information about their own marginal cost and incomplete information about their competitor. Assumptions which have been used to construct the model are based on Iran’s electricity market structure. The outcome indicates that although players bid functions in alternative auction mechanism differ from each other, the production efficiency, total efficiency and the average expected price are equivalent.
